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COLONIAL LEGACIES AND MINORITY RIGHTS 
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TOM BROWER* 
ABSTRACT 
Minority rights constitute some of the most normatively and 
economically important human rights. Although the political science and 
legal literatures have proffered a number of constitutional and institutional 
design solutions to address the protection of minority rights, these solutions 
are characterized by a noticeable neglect of, and lack of sensitivity to, 
historical processes. This Article addresses that gap in the literature by 
developing a causal argument that explains diverging practices of minority 
rights protections as functions of colonial governments’ variegated 
institutional practices with respect to particular ethnic groups. Specifically, 
this Article argues that in instances where colonial governments politicize 
and institutionalize ethnic hegemony in the pre-independence period, an 
institutional legacy is created that leads to lower levels of minority rights 
protections. Conversely, a uniform treatment and depoliticization of 
ethnicity prior to independence ultimately minimizes ethnic cleavages post-
independence and consequently causes higher levels of minority rights 
protections. Through a highly structured comparative historical analysis of 
Botswana and Ghana, this Article builds on a new and exciting research 
agenda that focuses on the role of long-term historio-structural and 
institutional influences on human rights performance and makes important 
empirical contributions by eschewing traditional methodologies that focus 
on single case studies that are largely descriptive in their analyses. 
Ultimately, this Article highlights both the strength of a historical approach 
to understanding current variations in minority rights protections and the 
varied institutional responses within a specific colonial government. 
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“I rose. Then noticed a small sketch of oils, on a panel, representing a 
woman, draped and blind-folded, carrying a lighted torch. The background 
was sombre—almost black. The movement of the woman was stately, and 
the effect of the torchlight on the face was sinister.” 
  -Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Minority rights constitute some of the most normatively and 
economically important human rights.1 Though indigenous groups 
 
 1.  See WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM, 
AND CITIZENSHIP 6 (2001) (describing a “clear shift in public opinion” in viewing minority rights as a 
matter of “fundamental justice”); Ilan Saban, Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies: A Framework 
for Analysis and the Case of the Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israel, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 885, 
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traditionally constitute national minorities, they face particular harships,2 
and, accordingly, are generally afforded robust legal protections under 
international law.3 Notwithstanding these exigencies, minority rights 
constitute some of the most difficult human rights to protect and enforce.4 
Although the political science and legal literatures have proffered a number 
of constitutional and institutional design solutions to address the protection 
of minority rights, these solutions are characterized by a noticeable neglect 
of, and lack of sensitivity to, historical processes. This Article addresses that 
gap in the literature by developing a causal argument that explains diverging 
practices of minority rights protections as functions of colonial governments’ 
variegated institutional practices with respect to particular ethnic groups.5 
Although contemporary approaches to minority rights protections vary 
widely with respect to their conceptualization of ethnicity and how 
institutions should be designed to address the question of minority rights,6 
this Article emphasizes the causal effects of historically-conditioned 
institutions on current protections of minority rights. Specifically, this 
Article draws on principles of historical institutionalism and colonial legacy 
to argue that variations in how ethnicity was conceptualized and 
institutionalized during colonial rule created particular post-colonial 
institutions that shaped current minority rights protections. Specifically, 
when ethnicity is institutionalized and politicized during colonial rule, lower 
levels of minority rights are expected in the future, not only because ethnicity 
is a salient political cleavage, but also because ethnic groups are often placed 
into asymmetrical political power relationships. Thus, in these instances, 
 
907 (2004) (explaining that “group-differentiated rights” provide “significant” and “permanent” 
protection to minority groups); Yousef T. Jabareen, Redefining Minority Rights: Successes and 
Shortcomings of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 119, 140–41 (2011) (explaining that “international discourse has reached a consensus that minority 
groups require special legal protections of its status” to resist pressures from the majority). 
 2.  See Abdulrahim P. Vijapur, International Protection of Minority Rights, 43 INT’L STUD. 367, 
387 (2006); Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and 
International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 98 (1999); Carolyn Stephens et al., Indigenous 
Peoples’ Health—Why Are They Behind Everyone, Everywhere?, 366 THE LANCET 10, 11 (2005).  
 3.  See STÉPHANIE C. JANET, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INTERNATIONAL, DEVELOPMENT, 
MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A CASE STUDY AND EVALUATION OF GOOD PRACTICE 10 
(2002); Jabareen, supra note 1, at 130–31. 
 4.  See Elena A. Baylis, Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 
66, 66, 73 (2005). 
 5.  See Carola Lentz & Paul Nugent, Ethnicity in Ghana: A Comparative Perspective, in 
ETHNICITY IN GHANA: THE LIMITS OF INVENTION 6 (Carola Lentz & Paul Nugent eds., 2000) (“Ethnicity 
is indeed above all a problem that has to be approached historically, but through history of a particular 
kind, namely an approach that breaks through the epistemological barrier between the pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial periods.”).  
 6.  See infra notes 9–14 and accompanying text.  
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ethnic majorities in power will likely have less respect for minority rights. 
Conversely, when ethnicity is depoliticized during colonial periods, higher 
protections of minority rights can be expected because ethnicity has not 
emerged as a salient political cleavage and no ethnic group has a historically 
privileged position of political power compared to other ethnic groups. This 
Article makes substantial and important contributions to the human rights 
literature. On conceptual and theoretical fronts, this Article builds on new 
and exciting research by Adam Chilton and Eric Posner that focuses on the 
role of long-term historio-structural and institutional influences on human 
rights performance.7 By utilizing the concepts of critical junctures and path-
dependency, this Article furthers this research agenda by introducing new 
conceptual and theoretical tools into the human rights law toolkit. 
Empirically, this Article makes important contributions by eschewing 
traditional methodologies that focus on single case studies that are largely 
descriptive in their analyses.8 Instead, it provides a highly-structured, 
comparative historical analysis of two most similar cases. In doing so, this 
Article highlights both the strength of a historical approach to understanding 
current variations in minority rights protections and the varied institutional 
responses within a specific colonial government. 
This Article is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on 
minority rights through the conceptual lens of internal self-determination and 
the constitutional and institutional design principles that have been advanced 
to support the protection of minority rights. Section III develops a theoretical 
framework that blends principles of historical institutionalism and path 
dependency with the colonial state’s role of transforming and 
institutionalizing ethnicity. It then draws a causal connection between this 
theory and current variations in minority rights protections. Section IV 
qualitatively and quantitatively compares two former British African 
colonies with differing degrees of minority rights protections—Botswana 
and Ghana—in order to provide empirical support for a historical theory of 
minority rights protections. Section V concludes, offers policy 
recommendations and identifies implications for future scholarship. 
 
 7.  See Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, The Influence of History on States’ Compliance with 
Human Rights Obligations 4–6 (U. Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 513, 2015), 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory/531/ [https://perma.cc/ZB6J-ZP2Y] 
(56 VA. J. INT’L L. forthcoming 2016). 
 8.  See, e.g., Jeremy Sarkin & Amelia Cook, The Human Rights of the San (Bushmen) of 
Botswana—the Clash of the Rights of Indigenous Communities and Their Access to Water with the Rights 
of the State to Environmental Conservation and Mineral Resource Exploitation, 20 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 1 (2011); Nicholas Olmsted, Indigenous Rights in Botswana: Development, Democracy and 
Dispossession, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 799 (2004). 
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II.  MINORITY RIGHTS AS INTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
The question of how to design formal political institutions to best 
protect minority rights speaks to a broader theoretical question of integration 
versus accommodation.9 Accommodationists “insist that in certain 
context[s], national, ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions and identities 
are resilient, durable and hard.”10 As a result, accommodation supports “dual 
or multiple identities” and “minimally requires the recognition of one or 
more ethnic, linguistic, national or religious community in the state.”11 By 
comparison, integrationists reject the idea that ethnic differences should 
translate into differences in the political area.12 Instead, they advocate for a 
common public identity despite ethnocultural or ethnolinguistic diversity.13 
From an institutional perspective, integrationists may advocate for 
ethnocultural assimilation, which renders impossible political mobilization 
around ethnic differences, or more mediated institutional strategies that 
promote a public identity without imposing ethnocultural uniformity in 
private and associational life.14 
The international human rights framework has grounded minority rights 
within the right of self-determination. According to Patrick Thornberry, 
“[t]he external dimension or aspect defines the status of a people in relation 
to another people, State or Empire, whereas the democratic or internal 
dimension should concern the relationship between a people and ‘its own’ 
State or government.”15 Specifically, the right to self-determination operates 
solely within the territorial boundaries of existing states through domestic 
political institutions.16 Although operationalizing the right to self-
 
 9.  See generally John McGarry et al., Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in 
Conflict Regulation, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR 
ACCOMMODATION? 41–88 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008); John Boye Ejobowah, Integrationist and 
Accommodationist Measures in Nigeria’s Constitutional Engineering: Successes and Failures, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION?, supra note 9, 
at 233–57. 
 10.  Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: 
Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: 
INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION?, supra note 9, at 27. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some 
Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 101, 101 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 
1993). 
 16.  See Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 733, 734 (1995) (describing the common “strategy” of characterizing minority rights 
as essentially within the “internal right” of self-determination, and thus a matter of “domestic political 
institutions”).  
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determination as an internal right may require a restructuring of domestic 
institutions, laws, and policies, changing the physical boundaries of the state 
and infringing on its territorial integrity would not be required.17 The 
literature has generally focused on three sets of institutions to foster the 
protection of minority rights: (1) democratic institutions, (2) autonomy 
regimes, and (3) cultural protections.18 
Increasingly, human rights scholars have noted that “[t]he very 
definition of the state must . . . reflect the ethnic diversity of the polity, and 
acknowledge that the state is an aggregation of ethnically and linguistically 
distinct regions and sometimes of several distinct nationalities.”19 
Accordingly, constitutions have been assigned particularly important 
functions in divided societies. First, constitutions perform a regulatory role 
and influence political decision-making by creating the “rules of the game.”20 
However, Sujit Choudhry notes that “a constitution must go further and 
constitute the very demos which governs itself under and through the 
constitutional regime.”21 Indeed, constitutions are often considered a 
principal vehicle for creating common political identities, articulating a 
particular view of the political community, and securing legitimacy for the 
exercise of political power.22 Due to the shortcomings of majoritarian 
democracies with respect to the protection of minority rights,23 constitutions 
emerge as a central defining power in divided societies because of their 
inherent tension with, and constraining power on, democratic 
majoritarianism.24 
A.  Democracy and Its Discontents 
As a first-order issue, the literature has generally agreed that 
democracies are better suited to promote and protect minority rights than 
autocratic, authoritarian, or other hegemonic regimes.25 However, the 
 
 17.  See id. 
 18.  See id. at 734, 752–56. 
 19.  Neelan Tiruchelvam, The Crisis of Constitutionalism: South Asian Perspectives, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 361, 363 
(Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993). However, it is worth noting that this international human rights 
law position exists merely as soft law and lacks authoritative commentary. 
 20.  See Choudhry, supra note 10, at 5–6; see generally STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND 
CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995).  
 21.  Choudhry, supra note 10, at 5–6. Choudhry describes this as the “constitutive conception.” 
 22.  See id. at 6; Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 1861, 1863 (2004). 
 23.  See infra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
 24.  Issacharoff, supra note 22, at 1861. 
 25.  Compare DONALD ROTHCHILD, MANAGING ETHNIC CONFLICT IN AFRICA 18 (1997) (“[i]n 
sum, hegemonic regimes failed to enclose social conflict and tended to foster deadlocks in state-society 
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particular institutional design is of utmost importance, given the acrimonious 
stance the literature has taken towards majoritarian democracy in 
communally and ethnically divided societies. As Donald Horowitz notes, 
“[i]n ethnically divided societies, majority rule is not a solution; it is a 
problem, because it permits domination, apparently in perpetuity.”26 The 
dominant political actor in divided societies is the ethnic political party, with 
individuals casting votes on purely ethnic lines. Accordingly, elections 
become censuses.27 The indefinite exclusion of minority groups from politics 
has important functional and normative implications. According to Adam 
Przeworski, the stability of electoral democracy rests on the losers accepting 
defeat in expectation that they might be able to win in subsequent elections.28 
However, this is not a realistic expectation when majoritarian democracy is 
utilized in severely fractured societies. Furthermore, Arend Lijphart notes 
that the most important requirement of democracy is that citizens have the 
opportunity to participate in decision making, either directly or indirectly.29 
Accordingly, narrow majority rule is “totally immoral, inconsistent with the 
primary meaning of democracy, and destructive of any prospect of building 
a nation in which different peoples might live together in harmony.”30 In 
light of majoritarian democracy’s ill-fit within divided societies, the 
literature has proffered other democratic institutional designs that better suit 
the needs of these societies and better protect minority rights. 
1.  Consociational Democracy and Proportional Representation 
Consociational democracy has been championed as a democratic model 
capable of facilitating interethnic and intercommunal accommodation, 
managing ethnic cleavages, and yielding politically stable democracies.31 
The critical elements of the consociational model are: 
 
relations.”), with id. at 48 (“Democratic regimes, with their emphasis upon low state control, open party 
contestation, regular elections, and public accountability, provide features that can facilitate intergroup 
cooperation.”). But see Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward A New Paradigm for 
Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1998) (“[I]n the developing world, democracy 
characteristically pits a politically powerful but impoverished “indigenous” majority against an 
economically dominant ethnic minority.”) (footnote omitted). 
 26.  Donald L. Horowitz, Democracy in Divided Societies, 4 J. DEM. 18, 29 (1993); see also Li-ann 
Thio, Constitutional Accommodation of the Rights of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Plural 
Democracies: Lessons and Cautionary Tales from South-East Asia, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 43, 65 (2010). 
 27.  Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers, in CONFLICT AND 
PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 115, 116 (Joseph V. Montville ed., 1990). 
 28.  ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN 
EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 23–24 (1991). 
 29.  Arend Lijphart, Back to Democratic Basics: Who Really Practices Majority Rule?, in 
DEMOCRACY’S VICTORY AND CRISIS 143, 143 (Axel Hadenius ed., 1997). 
 30.  Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 31.  See id.; Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J. DEM. 96, 99 (2004) 
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(1) government by a grand coalition of all significant segments; (2) a 
mutual veto or concurrent-majority voting rule for some or all issues; (3) 
proportionality as the principle for allocating political representation, 
public funds, and civil service positions; and (4) considerable autonomy 
for various segments of the society to govern their internal affairs.32 
Recently, the model has been simplified to focus on two primary 
elements: “broad participation in decision making by the representatives of 
different ethnic-communal groups and cultural autonomy for those groups 
that wish to have it.”33 The key to the consociational model’s power sharing 
mechanism is the fragmentation of political representation through a 
proportional representation (“PR”) voting system that promotes the 
representation of minorities who would be outvoted in a single member 
district plurality scheme under majoritarian democracy.34 Fragmented 
legislatures create incentives for cross-ethnic cooperation in the legislature 
and in the executive through grand coalition cabinets.35 Mutual vetoes and 
segmental autonomy provide an additional layer of institutional safeguards 
that create incentives for minority leaders to engage in the political process.36 
Although the consociational model has been criticized as relatively rigid in 
its institutional design, Arend Lijphart has noted that each of the institutional 
requirements can be tailored to specific societal circumstances with respect 
to both design and implementation.37 
However, consociational democracy and PR systems have been 
criticized as being “motivationally inadequate” insofar as they fail to explain 
why leaders of ethnic groups would have the proper incentives to cooperate 
and enter into a power sharing arrangement in the first place.38 Critiques of 
these models suggest little incentive for ethnic parties to adopt moderate, 
cross-cutting policies because these parties ultimately come under attack 
 
(advocating power sharing as a democratic model that “offers the best fit for most divided societies 
regardless of their individual circumstances and characteristics”). 
 32.  AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 25 
(1977). 
 33.  Lijphart, supra note 29, at 143; see also Choudhry, supra note 10, at 18–19.  
 34.  For qualitative support, see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 641–45 
(1985) (Sri Lanka and Guyana).  
 35.  Choudhry, supra note 10, at 19; see Issacharoff, supra note 22, at 1864. 
 36.  Choudhry, supra note 10, at 19. 
 37.  Arend Lijphart, Consociation: The Model and its Applications in Divided Societies, in 
POLITICAL CO-OPERATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 166, 174–75 (Desmond Rea ed., 1983). 
 38.  Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes, in THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND 
DEMOCRACY 20 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002); Richard H. Pildes, Ethnic Identity and Democratic 
Institutions: A Dynamic Perspective, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES, supra note 
9, at 173, 189–90. 
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from extremist parties in an “ethnic outbidding” process.39 Accordingly, 
politics remains a zero-sum game for each ethnic party. Because there are 
penalties rather than incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation, the short-term 
stability of a particular inter-ethnic coalition and the long-term stability of 
the institutional system as a whole are undermined.40 
2.  Integrationist Democracy and Alternative Vote 
As a response to the extant critiques of consociational democracy and 
PR systems, Donald Horowitz has proffered an integrationist democratic 
model and a set of electoral institutions that create political incentives for 
ethnic moderation.41 Accordingly, the analytical focus of integration is on 
encouraging the crossing of the so-called ethnic aisle rather than a pure 
power sharing regime. Thus, the underlying logic is to concurrently require 
ethnic parties to rely on other groups and “make moderation pay” by 
rewarding ethnic parties that appeal to ethnic groups other than their own.42 
This focus on moderation seeks to marginalize intra-ethnic competition at 
the extremes through an electoral tradeoff: the possibility of cross-ethnic 
support should offset electoral losses from the extremes. However, this 
cross-ethnic support is conditioned on a moderation of platforms and 
political conduct.43 
In the integrationist model, ethnic moderation is accomplished through 
inter-ethnic vote transfers, also known as “vote pooling.”44 The institutional 
mechanism to facilitate vote pooling is the alternative voting electoral 
system. Voters rank candidates in order of preference and, if a candidate is 
not elected through first preferences, the bottom candidate is dropped and 
the second preferences are distributed. Accordingly, incentives are created 
to appeal across ethnic lines in order to acquire enough second preferences 
from other ethnic groups to secure a majority.45 As a result, “[t]here is an ex 
ante effect that might moderate ethnic divides among voters.”46 Empirically, 
vote pooling systems have been met with mixed results.47 
 
 39.  Choudhry, supra note 10, at 21. 
 40.  See id.; Adeno Addis, Deliberative Democracy in Severely Fractured Societies, 16 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 67 (2009). 
 41.  Donald L. Horowitz, The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede, 14 J. DEM. 5, 15 
(2003); see Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS 253, 262 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000). 
 42.  Donald L. Horowitz, Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict 
Management, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES, supra note 27, at 471. 
 43.  Choudhry, supra note 10, at 21. 
 44.  See id.; Pildes, supra note 38, at 190–91. 
 45.  Choudhry, supra note 10, at 21. 
 46.  Pildes, supra note 38, at 191. 
 47.  See Jon Fraenkel & Bernard Grofman, Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in 
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B.  When the Center Holds: Autonomy Regimes 
Autonomy regimes broadly constitute a package of institutions and 
policies focusing on principles of federalism and intergovernmental 
relations. Although institutionally and analytically distinct from voting 
systems, federalism can be used to complement and reinforce a particular 
voting model. It is generally agreed that federalism has two essential 
attributes. First, federalism requires that political power be structurally 
dispersed among multiple centers of authority.48 This dispersion creates a 
“set of nested, geographically based governmental institutions in which the 
central authority and each of the subauthorities exercise separate normative 
control over segments of the political environment.”49 Accordingly, 
subnational units have a right to enjoy part of the autonomy they would have 
possessed as independent states, while the central government retains 
general authority over the entire territory. Federalism’s second attribute lies 
in the constitutional mandate guaranteeing the legitimacy of the authority of 
the various subnational units and their claims of right against the central 
government.50 In a unitary system, decentralized power can be reclaimed at 
the central government’s discretion. By contrast, in a federal system, 
“subordinate units possess prescribed areas of jurisdiction that cannot be 
invaded by the central authority, and leaders of the subordinate units draw 
their power from sources independent of that central authority.”51 However, 
it is important to note the decentralization and recentralization must be 
viewed both as a question of degree as well as a dynamic process.52 
Federalism is widely considered an effective institutional design 
principle for accommodating ethnic diversity, fostering embedded values 
within ethnic communities, and facilitating self-rule.53 Indeed, “federalism 
 
Ethnically Divided Societies? The Case of Fiji, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 623, 648 (2006); Richard H. Pildes 
& Kristin A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEG. F. 241, 243. But see 
Pildes, supra note 38, at 191.  
 48.  DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 34 (1987). 
 49.  Kim Lane Scheppele, The Ethics of Federalism, in POWER DIVIDED: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM 51, 52 (Harry N. Scheiber & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 1989). 
 50.  ELAZAR, supra note 48, at 34.  
 51.  Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 903, 911 (1994). 
 52.  See J. TYLER DICKOVICK, DECENTRALIZATION AND RECENTRALIZATION IN THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD: COMPARATIVE STUDIES FROM LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA 2 (2011).  
 53.  See Thio, supra note 26, at 48 (“In some cases, particularly where ethnic-religious cleavages 
are territorially based, forms of spatial autonomy such as federalism, confederalism, and confederation 
may be useful methods to adopt pursuant to the principle of ‘internal self-determination.’”); see also 
KYMLICKA, supra note 1, at 92; Pildes, supra note 38, at 198; Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Federalism: 
Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 57 (2003); HOROWITZ, supra note 34, at 617–
21. 
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is particularly attractive as compared with the more overtly consociational 
features conventionally, and frequently, used in divided societies.”54 
Federalism provides an important layer of protection for ethnic minorities, 
particularly in nations characterized by de jure non-discrimination but de 
facto political exclusion due to ethnic hegemony.55 The literature has 
advanced both political and economic arguments to support federalism with 
respect to the protection of minority rights. Subnational ethnic autonomy has 
been identified as one form of institutional arrangement that is congruent 
with ethno-nationalist beliefs focusing on “the distinctiveness of a particular 
people and their right to self-rule in their homeland.”56 Diane Orentlicher 
considers two different views of democracy aimed at legitimizing ethnic 
federalism. First, the utilitarian view contends that ethnic federalism offers 
the best domestic institutional framework for aggregating the interests of the 
members of an ethnic group and for promoting democratic governance.57 
Second, the republican view focuses on ethnic federalism’s potential to 
create an enabling environment for citizens to consider the common good in 
their public deliberations.58 Synthesizing these two views, framing politics 
within a federal context provides subnational representatives incentives to 
work within the established system of government to further the aggregate 
interests of their ethnic constituency. 
Furthermore, federalism may offer a plethora of economic benefits. The 
literature has recognized that subnational units provide a necessary 
foundation for fostering economic competition, expanding resources, and 
enhancing the efficiency of a nation as a whole.59 Beyond promoting 
 
 54.  Pildes, supra note 38, at 198. 
 55.  See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 350–51 (arguing 
that, in general, constitutional separation of powers tends to encourage cooperative and coalescent 
strategies; separation of power and federalism “decreases the distinctiveness of the opposition and the 
chances for a strictly competitive contest between government and opposition”). This is closely related 
to the issues with majoritarian democracy in divided societies. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying 
text.  
 56.  MILTON J. ESMAN, ETHNIC POLITICS 28 (1994); see also Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free 
Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 287, 315 
(2000) (distinguishing ethnonationalism as “that form of nationalism ‘in which the nation is defined in 
terms of assumed blood ties and ethnicity’”). 
 57.  Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims, 
23 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 53–54 (1998). 
 58.  Id. at 54–56. 
 59.  Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic 
Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50, 58 (1995). This argument is more generally known as “market-
preserving federalism.” See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 3 (1995). But see generally 
Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1521 
(1997) (critiquing market-preserving federalism). 
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competition and experimentation, federal systems also allow subnational 
governments to “serve as semi-independent and entrepreneurial poles of 
development, both for resource mobilization and for the provision of public 
goods and services in a manner that is more responsive to citizens’ needs and 
demands than provision by a single central government.”60 It has even been 
asserted that ethnic-based governments “[m]ay be more efficient in the 
provision of public goods than the state” because they are less prone to face 
prisoner’s dilemma and free-rider problems.61 Finally, federalism might 
offer ethnic groups greater opportunities for control over local resources and 
revenues and provide a conduit for distributing the benefits of community 
development among subnational jurisdictions. Daniel Elazar notes: 
[B]ecause of the existence of federalism . . . resources are inevitably 
spread over a number of centers. At the very least, the capital of every 
federated state has some claim on the national resources, and together they 
work to prevent the single metropolis syndrome. This means that more 
people have a chance to benefit from development efforts. At least, it 
means that some of the worst excesses of resource concentration are 
eliminated, and a basis for truly national development begins to emerge.62 
However, federalism is by no means a panacea for ethnically divided 
societies. First, ethnic federalism requires ethnic groups to be regionally 
concentrated for effective administrative subnational boundaries to be 
drawn.63 Second, federalism is not without cost; there are financial costs 
associated with duplication of functions, physical capital development, and 
diseconomies of scale.64 There are also ethnic conflict costs that need to be 
considered, including tensions with respect to the ethnic composition of the 
subnational units’ civil service and the risk that particular ethnic groups may 
be incapable of working outside their own region.65 Third, federalism has 
generally been characterized as an unstable form of government—even when 
not coupled with ethnicity.66 Indeed, “virtually every federal state of any 
standing has had sooner or later to face a concerted bid for secession by one 
 
 60.  Lapido Adamolekum & John Kincaid, The Federal Solution: Assessment and Prognosis for 
Nigeria and Africa, 21 PUBLIUS 173, 183 (1991). 
 61.  Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Harmonizing Ethnic Claims in Africa: A Proposal for Ethnic-Based 
Federalism, 18 CATO J. 43, 54–58 (1998). 
 62.  ELAZAR, supra note 48, at 252. 
 63.  See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT 
SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 48 (1991) (presenting the “normative nationalist principle” that 
“political and cultural (or ethnic) boundaries must, as a matter of right, coincide”). 
 64.  See HOROWITZ, supra note 34, at 621–22.  
 65.  Id. at 622; see Selassie, supra note 53, at 92.  
 66.  See Greg Craven, Of Federalism, Secession, Canada and Quebec, 14 DALHOUSIE L.J. 231, 243 
(1991) (“It must be admitted as a simple matter of statistics, the picture for an ardent supporter of 
federalism is not an encouraging one.”). 
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or more of its component regions.”67 Lastly, by structuring a polity along 
ethnic lines, ethnic federalism has the potential to restrict the mobility of 
labor, goods, and capital across subnational jurisdictions,68 create new 
economic divisions organized around ethnic lines,69 and contribute to 
interjurisdictional wealth disparity.70 
C.  Polyethnic Rights and Cultural Protections 
Group-differentiated rights focusing on cultural accommodation (also 
known as polyethnic rights)71 are a third institutional mechanism that 
protects minority rights. Minority groups often seek recognition of their 
cultural distinctiveness. Some of these cultural aspects require protections 
that go beyond individual rights and rely primarily on group membership.72 
For instance, the South African Constitution—well known for its recognition 
of the language and cultural rights of minorities—protects the right “to 
receive education in the official language or languages of [one’s] choice”73 
and requires the state to take “positive measures to elevate the status and 
advance the use” of eleven officially identified languages.74 These rights are 
provided out of recognition that minority groups are vulnerable, minority 
cultures are fragile, and that cultural loss would constitute a substantial blow 
to members’ self-identity.75 
One possible problem associated with cultural accommodation rights is 
the potential for entrenchment of ethno-cultural identities into democratic 
political competition. Some ethnic groups fear that their cultural interests 
will be overridden unless their interests are integrated into existing state 
institutions. This can lead to “undifferentiated general demands for 
accommodationist institutions and policies across the board.”76 One solution 
to this problem is to use different constitutional structures for the political 
and cultural spheres.77 By accommodating cultural concerns with guarantees 
of positive and negative cultural rights while basing formal political 
institutions (such as electoral competition and representation) on 
integrationist principles, a less ethnicized but more flexible political system 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Selassie, supra note 53, at 89. 
 69.  HOROWITZ, supra note 34, at 7–9; Chua, supra note 25, at 5. 
 70.  Selassie, supra note 53, at 91–92. 
 71.  See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 30–31 (1995).  
 72.  See, e.g., id. at 110–11.  
 73.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 29(2). 
 74.  Id. § 6. 
 75.  See Saban, supra note 1, at 906–07. 
 76.  Pildes, supra note 38, at 193. 
 77.  Id. at 194.  
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can emerge.78 The next section uses these design elements as a springboard 
to theoretically frame the institutional protection of minority rights in a 
historical, path dependent context. 
III.  A PATH DEPENDENT THEORY OF COLONIAL LEGACIES AND 
MINORITY RIGHTS 
While the internal self-determination literature has offered a number of 
thoughtful and flexible institutional arrangements to protect the political and 
cultural rights of minority groups, its efforts have noticeable and important 
weaknesses. First, the literature eschews the historical development of 
minority rights and largely examines the protection of minority rights in a 
temporal vacuum. Institutions are inherently change resistant. As a result, 
little theoretical attention has been paid to the origins of these institutions 
and how they change over time. Second, the literature places a premium on 
both the design and quality of formal political institutions, but it struggles to 
explain anomalous cases—in particular, the low levels of minority rights 
protections in relatively well-institutionalized and robust democracies. 
Accordingly, this section develops both a theoretical framework and a causal 
argument that offer a historio-institutional perspective on minority rights 
protections, and contribute to a budding research agenda that addresses 
history’s effect on states’ compliance with human rights obligations. This 
section proceeds in three parts. First, theories of historical institutionalism 
and path dependency are outlined as an analytical framework. Next, the 
colonial legacy literature is engaged, focusing on diverging administrative 
practices and colonial treatment of ethnicity in Africa. Lastly, these two parts 
are synthesized to craft a causal argument focusing on the path dependent 
relationship between ethnic institutionalization under colonial rule and 
current minority rights protections. 
A.  Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependency 
While institutionalism has long been entrenched in legal scholarship,79 
historical institutionalism has only more recently made inroads into legal 
scholarship.80 “At its broadest, historical institutionalism represents an 
 
 78.  South Africa’s constitutional system exemplifies this. See generally Christina Murray & 
Richard Simeon, Recognition Without Empowerment: Minorities in a Democratic South Africa, 5 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 699 (2007). 
 79.  See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1996). 
 80.  See Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten Linkages—Historical Institutionalism and Sociological 
Institutionalism and Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 461, 461 n.2 
(1998); Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 239–43 
(1999). 
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attempt to illuminate how political struggles ‘are mediated by the 
institutional setting in which [they] take place.’”81 Sven Steinmo extends the 
metaphor of the historical institutionalist as an environmental biologist who 
believes that, in order to understand the specific fate of a particular organism 
or behavior, he or she must explicitly examine that organism in the ecology 
or context in which it lives.82 
Historical institutionalism is closely associated with a distinctive 
perspective of understanding historical development and the place of 
institutions in historical context.83 Path dependency is the principal 
mechanism through which historical institutionalism operates. As described 
by Stephen Krasner: 
Historical developments are path dependent; once certain choices are 
made, they constrain future possibilities. The range of options available to 
policymakers at any given point in time is a function of institutional 
capabilities that were put in place at some earlier period, possibly in 
response to very different environmental pressures.84 
Institutions are intrinsically change-resistant and “sticky” insofar as 
once they are created and actors venture down a particular path, they are 
unlikely to change or reverse course.85 This is due primarily to self-
reinforcing mechanisms built into existing institutions and the high social 
and economic costs associated with institutional change.86 Thus, many 
historical institutionalists also divide the flow of historical events into 
periods of continuity punctuated by “critical junctures”—moments when 
substantial institutional change takes place and creates a branching point 
 
 81.  Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, in 
STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 2 (Sven Steinmo 
et al. eds., 1992). 
 82.  Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism, in APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES IN THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES: A PLURALIST PERSPECTIVE 128 (Donatella Della Porta & Michael Keating eds., 
2008).  
 83.  See Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936, 941 (1996). 
 84.  Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective, 21 COMP. POL. STUD. 66, 67 
(1988); see also Orfeo Fioretos, Historical Institutionalism in International Relations, 65 INT’L ORG. 
367, 375 (2011) (footnote omitted).  
 85.  See Paul Pierson, The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change, 13 
GOVERNANCE 475, 493 (2000) (“Actors do not inherit a blank slate that they can remake at will when 
their preferences shift or unintended consequences become visible. Instead, actors find that the dead 
weight of previous institutional choices seriously limits their room to maneuver.”); Paul Pierson & Theda 
Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE 
STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 703 (Ira Katznelson & Helen Milner eds., 2002); PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN 
TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 151 (2004). 
 86.  Mariana Prado & Michael Trebilcock, Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of 
Institutional Reform, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 350–53 (2009). 
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from which historical development moves onto a new path.87 Accordingly, 
existing institutional relationships have a causal effect on new policies and 
institutional arrangements. 
B.  Colonial Legacies 
1.  Constructing Bula Matari? 
The starting point for developing a historical theory of minority rights 
protection is to conceptualize colonial legacies to better understand how 
institutional, social, and economic structures developed under colonialism 
remain deeply embedded in modern institutions. Focusing on African 
colonialism is particularly useful because of the extent of institutional 
transformation, breadth of geographic scope,88 and variation of legacies 
within a single colonial state—both between colonies of the same colonizer 
and of different colonizers. In Africa, the colonial state lasted less than a 
century in most instances. However, colonialism “totally reordered political 
space, societal hierarchies and cleavages, and modes of economic 
production.”89 Colonial rule also created arbitrary territorial boundaries 
when Europeans at the 1884 Conference of Berlin agreed to carve “this 
magnificent African cake” into pieces.90 Indeed, Crawford Young famously 
describes the African colonial state as the “Bula Matari” or “crusher of 
rocks.”91 Drawing on legal anthropology, Lauren MacLean attenuates this 
point and contends that the “new formal state institutions and informal 
institutions transformed each other over time in a dialectical process of 
everyday interactions.”92 Nevertheless, there remains strong consensus in the 
literature that the postcolonial state inherited many of its structures, routines, 
practices, and normative theories of governance from its colonial masters.93 
 
 87.  Id. at 355–58; see generally DAVID COLLIER & RUTH COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL 
ARENA (1991); Stephen D. Krasner, Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical 
Dynamics, 16 COMP. POL. 223 (1984).  
 88.  All but two African nations—Liberia and Ethiopia—experienced periods of colonial rule. See, 
e.g., Ehiedu E.G. Iweriedor, SCHOMBURG CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN BLACK CULTURE, Africana Age: The 
Colonization of Africa, http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-colonization-of-africa.html [https:// 
perma.cc/348X-WV4L] (last visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
 89.  CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9 (1994).  
 90.  King Leopold of Belgium is credited with describing Africa this way prior to the Berlin 
conference. See, e.g., ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND 
HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 58 (1998). 
 91.  YOUNG, supra note 89, at 1, 283. 
 92.  LAUREN M. MACLEAN, INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND CITIZENSHIP IN RURAL AFRICA: RISK 
AND RECIPROCITY IN GHANA AND COTE D’IVOIRE 26 (2010).  
 93.  But see JEFFREY HERBST, STATES AND POWER IN AFRICA: COMPARATIVE LESSONS IN 
AUTHORITY AND CONTROL 4 (2000) (arguing “it was impossible for Europeans to have changed 
‘everything’ in the few decades they ruled Africa. They also had to take Africa’s political geography as 
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This effect is also seen at the microsocial level, as the “everyday reason of 
state, as it imposed its logic on the new rulers, incorporated subliminal codes 
of operation bearing the imprint of their colonial predecessors.”94 
Although there are general trends of political, economic, and social 
transformation under colonial rule, colonial legacies vary considerably due 
to significant differences in the hegemony, administrative policies, and 
ideologies of colonizers.95 While this Article need not undertake an 
exhaustive analysis of colonial practices and policies in Africa, the most 
fundamental differences among colonizers can be illustrated by contrasting 
Great Britain with other continental European states. The British tended to 
administer with a “less centralized historical personality, a less thorough 
impregnation with an earlier absolutist tradition, and a less prefectoral model 
of regional administration.”96 By comparison, “France stood at the other end 
of the spectrum, with the powerful Cartesian, Jacobin impulses that are a 
recurrent refrain in its imperial statecraft.”97 The difference between Great 
Britain’s decentralized, indirect rule and the centralized, direct rule of the 
French has spawned considerable research focusing on the mode of colonial 
rule as an explanatory variable or source of influence.98 
In addition to variation of colonial legacy between colonizers, it is 
important to note that legacies may also vary within the same colonizer and 
within a particular colonial state. In Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and 
James Robinson’s classic albeit controversial paper,99 they argue that 
Europeans often transplanted their own institutions when colonizing other 
parts of the world. Specifically, Europeans constructed low-quality 
institutions when they sought to extract resources and high-quality 
 
a given because they were unwilling and unable to change the landscape.”). 
 94.  YOUNG, supra note 89, at 283; see also MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: 
CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 37–61 (1996) (arguing that colonial 
rule in the countryside was characterized by “decentralized despotism” exercised by chiefs who owed 
their authority to their European masters, and that this setup was never effectively dismantled). 
 95.  See YOUNG, supra note 89, at 79. 
 96.  Id. at 99. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See, e.g., Lauren M. MacLean, Constructing a Social Safety Net in Africa: An Institutionalist 
Analysis of Colonial Rule and State Social Policies in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, 37 STUD. COMP. INT’L 
DEV. 64 (2002) (social service provision); MACLEAN, supra note 92 (informal institutions of reciprocity); 
see generally Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002) (common 
law/civil law and economic development). 
 99.  See generally Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An 
Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001); David Y. Albouy, The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 3059 (2012) 
(criticizing); Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation: Reply, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 3077 (2012) (defending). 
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institutions when they sought to engage in long-term investment.100 
Extraction was used when conditions were too harsh for colonists to survive 
for a long period of time because of disease or when valuable resources were 
abundant and easy to access.101 Otherwise, settlers invested for the long-term 
by transplanting legal, political, and economic institutions of the colonizing 
government into colonial society.102 Using settler mortality as an 
instrumental variable for historical institutional quality, Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson uncovered strong empirical evidence that settler mortality is 
negatively associated with current wealth.103 Additionally, scholars have 
found that the European share of the population during colonization is a 
predictor of current wealth.104 Accordingly, they argue that their results 
suggest the importance of the human capital that was brought by early 
European settlers during colonization.105 Adam Chilton and Eric Posner have 
applied these scholars’ arguments to human rights protections, and have 
found statistically significant correlations with respect to both variables.106 
Lastly, Catherine Boone contends that there are significant regional 
(subnational) variations in the patterns of centralization and decentralization 
of state power.107 For instance, the French colonial state in Senegal pursued 
a decentralized policy of administrative power sharing in the Wolof 
Groundnut Basin, but pursued a more centralized policy of administrative 
occupation in Lower Casamance, primarily in response to variations in social 
hierarchy and resource dependence in the respective rural societies.108 
2.  Colonialism and the Imagining of Ethnicity 
Colonial states’ engagements and interactions with the concept of 
African ethnicity are particularly relevant to this Article. Ethnicity is not only 
the “crucible of African politics,”109 but colonialism had a distinctive 
 
 100.  Acemoglu et al., supra note 99, at 1370. 
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.; see generally Daron Acemoglu et al., Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in 
the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1231 (2002). 
 104.  See Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots of Economic 
Development?, 51 J. ECON. LITERATURE 325, 338–41 (2013); Louis Putterman & David N. Weil, Post-
1500 Population Flows and the Long-Run Determinants of Economic Growth and Inequality, 125 Q.J. 
ECON. 1627, 1677 (2010); William Easterly & Ross Levine, The European Origins of Economic 
Development 23–24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18162, 2014), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18162.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S5R-F2R4]. 
 105.  See Easterly & Levine, supra note 104, at 2. 
 106.  Chilton & Posner, supra note 7, at 27–31. 
 107.  CATHERINE BOONE, POLITICAL TOPOGRAPHIES OF THE AFRICAN STATE 2 (2003). 
 108.  See id. at 43–140; see also MACLEAN, supra note 92, at 26 (focusing on Ghana and Cote 
d’Ivoire). 
 109.  PATRICK CHABAL & JEAN-PASCAL DALOZ, AFRICA WORKS: DISORDER AS POLITICAL 
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encounter with respect to ethnicity in Africa. In addition to European 
colonizers lacking knowledge of African political systems or cultural 
differences and creating highly heterogeneous, multiethnic states, African 
colonialism was accompanied by systematic theories of European racial 
superiority.110 According to Michael Crowder, “[t]he portrait of Africa 
painted by the colonial powers was one of a people who on the eve of 
occupation were politically decentralised, living in small villages, often 
naked, dominated by witchcraft, living in terror of their neighbours.”111 
Accordingly, European occupation and domination of Africans was 
infamously described in terms of a “sacred trust” or “The White Man’s 
Burden.”112 
The fact that the colonial state cemented the importance of ethnic 
identities in post-colonial Africa is not controversial.113 What is contested in 
the literature—similar to broader theories about colonial administration—is 
the extent to which colonial states created, transformed, and institutionalized 
ethnicity. Initially, the “colonial invention of tribes” school of thought 
dominated the literature.114 This ideology held that “Europeans implicitly 
believed their concept of ethnicity to be the natural order and not merely one 
convention amongst others used to make sense of the world.”115 Based on 
this belief, divide and rule tactics of colonial predecessors left behind a 
crippling legacy of intergroup tensions and communal mistrust and placed 
“an ethnic curse” on many postcolonial regimes.116 Modern theories have 
focused less on colonial agency.117 Instead, the literature has gravitated 
 
INSTRUMENT 49 (1999); see also Goran Hyden, Problems and Prospects of State Coherence in Africa, in 
STATE VERSUS ETHNIC CLAIMS: AFRICAN POLICY DILEMMAS 70 (Donald Rothchild & Victor A. 
Olorunsola eds., 1983) (describing ethnicity as an “essential aspect of African politics”). 
 110.  See YOUNG, supra note 89, at 280 (“[T]he creation of the African colonial state coincided with 
the historical zenith of virulent racism.”). 
 111.  MICHAEL CROWDER, WEST AFRICA UNDER COLONIAL RULE 12 (1968). 
 112.  Id. at 5; see also YOUNG, supra note 89, at 98 (“The conviction of African ‘savagery’ permeated 
European thought at the moment of colonial state construction.”). 
 113.  See DANIEL N. POSNER, INSTITUTIONS AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN AFRICA 23 (2005) (contending 
that to argue otherwise would likely be controversial).  
 114.  See CAROLA LENTZ, ETHNICITY AND THE MAKING OF HISTORY IN NORTHERN GHANA 6 
(2006). 
 115.  Patrick Harries, Exclusion, Classification, and Internal Colonialism: The Emergence of 
Ethnicity Among the Tsonga-Speakers of South Africa, in THE CREATION OF TRIBALISM IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 82, 90 (Leroy Vail ed., 1989); see also David Killingray, Imagined Martial Communities: 
Recruiting for the Military and Police in Colonial Ghana, 1860–1960, in ETHNICITY IN GHANA, supra 
note 5, at 119 (applying this principle to British colonialism). 
 116.  John Stone, Ethnicity Versus the State: The Dual Claims of State Coherence and Ethnic Self-
Determination, in STATE VERSUS ETHNIC CLAIMS, supra note 109, at 85. 
 117.  See Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa, in 
LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AFRICA 62 (Terence Ranger & Olufemi Vaughan 
eds., 1993) (noting that the convention of “invention” exaggerates the mechanical, authorial aspects of 
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towards the concept of “imagination”118 and has focused either on the 
creation of new identities or the reconfiguration of old ones—processes that 
involve many different actors with diverse intentions and interpretations.119 
Nevertheless, the colonial state had important yet varied roles in 
transforming and institutionalizing ethnicity, which this Article contends had 
causal consequences for current protections of minority rights. 
C.  Linking Colonial Legacies and Minority Rights 
Synthesizing the framework of historical institutionalism and the 
literature on colonial legacies, this Article argues that varying patterns of 
colonial institutional practices towards ethnic groups have had a causal, path 
dependent effect on current minority rights protections. Unlike Adam 
Chilton and Eric Posner’s research that alludes to the quality of historical 
institutions and their effects on human rights,120 this Article adopts a more 
subtle, contextual focus on how historical institutions are structured. In 
addition to imagining and transforming ethnic groups in myriads of ways,121 
colonial states also institutionalized and politicized ethnic groups to varying 
extents. Just as ethnicity can be organized and disorganized,122 ethnicity can 
also be politicized and depoliticized. In doing so, colonial institutions either 
fostered or constrained ethnicity as a political cleavage. Thus, in the colonial 
period, institutional foundations were built that placed particular ethnic 
groups into different positions of political power and salience. 
In the post-colonial period, a variety of ethnic paradigms have been 
recognized.123 One option was to “recognize the dominant position held by 
specific ‘intermediary’ groups, and thus identify the character of the newly 
emergent state with their assumed cultural, economic, and social pre-
eminence.”124 A second type came “in the form of a sudden switch of ethnic 
partnerships, soon accompanied by a drastic redistribution of power.”125 This 
 
creation as well as the functionality and rigidity of the end-product); CHABAL & DALOZ, supra note 109, 
at 57 (“[I]t is not possible . . . to assert an ‘iron law’ on the construction of ethnicity under colonial rule.”). 
 118.  See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN 
AND SPEED OF NATIONALISM (1983). 
 119.  See Lentz & Nugent, supra note 5, at 6; CHABAL & DALOZ, supra note 109, at 56–57. 
 120.  Chilton & Posner, supra note 7.  
 121.  See LENTZ, supra note 114, at 7–8.  
 122.  See Naomi Chazan, Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa, in 
THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE: STATE AND SOCIETY IN AFRICA 121, 134 (Donald Rothchild & Naomi 
Chazan eds., 1988). 
 123.  See René Lemarchand, The State and Society in Africa: Ethnic Stratification and 
Restratification in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in STATE VERSUS ETHNIC CLAIMS, supra 
note 109, at 58. 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id. 
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Article argues, based on principles of historical institutionalism and colonial 
legacy, that these differing ethnic paradigms map neatly onto the ethnically 
(de)politicized institutions created under colonial rule. Because ethnicity is 
conceptualized as a dynamic, rational, and instrumental form of political 
behavior,126 in the new colonial state, politicized ethnic groups will 
reproduce institutions, policies, and discourse that serve their political 
interests, while depoliticized ethnic groups will minimize the salience of 
ethnic cleavages. Thus, the creation of an ethnic political hegemony prior to 
independence often leads to an institutional legacy where ethnicity is utilized 
in an instrumental, political, and discriminatory fashion. 
Accordingly, when ethnicity is institutionalized and politicized during 
colonial rule, less appreciation of minority rights is anticipated in the post-
colonial period, not only because ethnicity is a salient political cleavage, but 
also because ethnic groups are often placed into asymmetrical political 
power relationships. Thus, in these instances, ethnic majorities in power will 
likely have less respect for minority rights. Conversely, when ethnicity is 
depoliticized in the colonial period, greater protection of minority rights can 
be anticipated in the post-colonial period because ethnicity has not emerged 
as a salient political cleavage and no ethnic group has a historically 
privileged position of political power compared to other ethnic groups. The 
next section provides qualitative and quantitative support for this historical 
and path dependent argument of minority rights protection. 
IV.  DIVERGING PATHS OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA 
AND GHANA 
A.  Research Design 
This Article utilizes a comparative analysis of two heuristic case 
studies127—Botswana and Ghana—to support the claim that colonial 
legacies of ethnic (de)politicization have causal effects on current minority 
rights protections. For empirical support, this Article draws on qualitative 
evidence from a structured comparative historical analysis of Botswana and 
Ghana’s treatment of ethnicity, post-independence political discourse 
focusing on ethnicity, laws and policies towards minority groups, and 
quantitative data of current minority rights protections from the Minorities 
 
 126.  See Robert H. Bates, Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in 
Contemporary Africa, in STATE VERSUS ETHNIC CLAIMS: AFRICAN POLICY DILEMMAS 152, 152 (Donald 
Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds., 1983) (describing ethnic groups as “coalitions which have been 
formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization”).  
 127.  See ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 75 (2005) (noting that “[h]euristic case studies inductively 
identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths”) (emphasis omitted). 
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at Risk dataset. Botswana and Ghana are used as cases due to their 
differences in minority rights protections despite many institutional and 
historical similarities.128 The countries’ institutional and historical 
similarities are important for case selection and comparative analysis 
because they effectively control for competing hypotheses that could 
otherwise explain variations in current minority rights protections. Both 
Botswana and Ghana are former British colonies governed under indirect 
rule. This is relevant because ethnicity is often a more salient cleavage in 
former-British colonies where society was more ethnicized and less 
assimilated than, for instance, French colonies that focused on the nuclear 
family system as the unit of governance.129 Moreover, both Botswana130 and 
Ghana131 have been lauded as robust, well-institutionalized democracies. 
Despite these similarities, non-Tswana minorities in Botswana—especially 
the San—have been marginalized throughout the country’s history, while 
Ghana has a strong record of minority rights protections. As history shows, 
these divergent paths reflect differing institutional patterns of ethnic politics 
developed under colonial British rule that were later reinforced and 
perpetuated following independence. 
B.  Botswana: Imagined and Instrumentalized Ethnic Homogeneity 
1.  Pre-Independence: Tswana as Intermediary 
Despite a common perception articulated by the state of Botswana, the 
country is not ethnically homogenous. Officially, the Tswana are the ethnic 
majority of Botswana at seventy-nine percent,132 but minorities arguably 
constitute well over half the nation’s population.133 Beginning during the pre-
colonial period and extending through British colonial rule, the Tswana have 
been institutionalized as the dominant political and social ethnic group in 
 
 128.  Although Botswana and Ghana share some differences with respect to the extent of pre-colonial 
ethnic hegemony, I believe such differences do not obviate the most similar systems nature of the cases 
or the theoretical validity of my argument.  
 129.  See MACLEAN, supra note 92, at 100.  
 130.  See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 89, at 2 (describing as “capably ruled”); James A. Robinson & Q. 
Neil Parsons, State Formation and Governance in Botswana, 15 J. AFR. ECON. 100, 100, 103 (2006) 
(describing the state as legal-rational); Daron Acemoglu et al., An African Success Story: Botswana, in 
IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 80, 84 (Dani Rodrik ed., 
2003) (emphasizing the quality of institutions). 
 131.  See, e.g., MacLean, supra note 98, at 84–85 (describing as a model of democratic 
consolidation). 
 132.  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CIA WORLD FACT BOOK—BOTSWANA, https:// 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html [https://perma.cc/3A2M-6FAU]  
(last visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
 133.  Jacqueline Solway, “Culture Fatigue”: The State and Minority Rights in Botswana, 18 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 214 (2011). 
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Botswana. For instance, the kgotla—the traditional village gathering place 
and central institution in Tswana local governance that has been lauded as a 
cultural manifestation of democratic consensus and a core reason behind 
Botswana’s broader political and economic success134—was highly 
exclusionary. As James Denbow and Phenyo Thebe note: 
[W]omen, minors, and unmarried men . . . were excluded from the 
deliberations. Only males who were members of the dominant Tswana 
ethnic group could participate in the kgotla. Subservient peoples, such as 
the Kgalagadi and Sarwa, had no right to voice an opinion or to take part 
in important decisions. Women were also excluded regardless of their 
ethnicity, and in even recent years some “traditional” kgotla meetings may 
be called that exclude women.135 
Under British colonial rule, ethnicity was further developed and 
institutionalized as a political cleavage. As a result, Tswana political 
domination over non-Tswana minority groups was crystallized. The British 
recognized the Tswana as their intermediary in Botswana because, upon 
arrival, it appeared that the Tswana were already in charge.136 Under the 
indirect rule system of “Native Reserves” and “Crown Lands,” Britain 
parceled the land without making land provisions for the San,137 despite their 
having lived in southern Africa for over 40,000 years.138 As colonial 
intermediaries, the Tswana held nearly complete control over these 
decentralized units of governance.139 As a result, non-Tswana minority 
groups, including the San, fell into subjugation under both British colonial 
officials and the Tswana ethnic majority.140 
Given the importance of hunting to their existence and culture, land 
reform is an essential policy issue for the San. As another scholar has noted, 
“since virtually no land had been expressly set aside for San groups, an 
especially important development in 1961 was the creation of the Central 
Kalahari Game Reserve (“CKGR”)—the largest protected area in Botswana 
 
 134.  See Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., Explaining Botswana’s Success, in DEVELOPING CULTURES: CASE 
STUDIES 3, 7 (Lawrence Harrison & Peter L. Berger eds., 2006). 
 135.  JAMES DENBOW & PHENYO C.THEBE, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF BOTSWANA 22. The Sarwa 
is another name for the San indigenous group in Botswana. See also Olmsted, supra note 8, at 815–16 
(describing the exclusionary tendencies of the kgotla). 
 136.  DITSHWANELO, SHADOW REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION 
OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (CERD), § 2(a) (68th Session, Geneva, Mar. 3–6, 2006). 
 137.  Olmsted, supra note 8, at 825–26. 
 138.  Nick Crumpton, ‘Earliest’ Evidence of Modern Human Culture Found, BBC NEWS (July 12, 
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-19069560; see also J.D. LEWIS-WILLIAMS, 
DISCOVERING SOUTHERN AFRICAN ROCK ART 17–18 (1990); Kenneth Good, At the Ends of the Ladder: 
Radical Inequalities in Botswana, 31 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 203, 206 (1993). 
 139.  Olmsted, supra note 8, at 825. 
 140.  Id. at 862. 
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and one of the largest in Africa.”141 Colonial regulations limited San hunting 
privileges and proscribed CKGR residents from keeping domestic animals, 
even though some San traditionally utilized dogs in hunting.142 However, the 
British colonial administration accorded the major Tswana tribes substantial 
autonomy in hunting regulation, but gave no such autonomy to San 
groups.143 These ethnic inequities with respect to land and hunting rights 
illustrate the development of ethnicity as a salient political cleavage in 
Botswana and an imbalance of institutional power between the Tswana and 
non-Tswana groups. They also foreshadow the Botswana government’s later 
rationalization of policies that further limited the rights of CKGR residents 
under the guise of protecting wildlife.144 
2.  Post-Independence: Tswana as Hegemon 
Both the structure and the politicization of formal political institutions 
along ethnic lines from colonial rule were preserved in post-independence 
Botswana.145 Accordingly, Tswana institutional ethnic hegemony carried 
over into the discourse, laws, and politics of the newly independent state. 
Botswana premised its nation-building efforts on an overstated assertion of 
ethnic homogeneity because of the significant representation of the 
Tswana.146 Importantly, the boilerplate bill of rights provided by Britain 
during colonialism carried over to post-colonial Botswana, emphasizing a 
more integrationist approach.147 Botswana’s first president, Sir Seretse 
Khama, emphasized a similar approach and focused heavily on fostering 
national unity in the country through a discourse of “non-racialism.”148 
However, given the historic and institutionalized political power of the 
 
 141.  Id. at 828 n. 161; see also Christian Erni, Resettlement of Khwe Communities Continues, 3/4 
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 8 (1997). 
 142.  Kristyna Bishop, Squatters on Their Own Land: San Territoriality in Western Botswana, 31 
COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 92, 113 (1997). 
 143.  CLIVE SPINAGE, HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE FAUNA CONSERVATION LAWS OF 
BOTSWANA 11 (1991) (noting that the first Assistant Commissioner was directed “not to interfere with 
the Native Administration; the Chiefs are understood not to be desirous of parting with their rights of 
sovereignty, nor are Her Majesty’s Government by any means anxious to assume the responsibilities of 
it”). 
 144.  See id. at 60–61. 
 145.  See ROTHCHILD, supra note 25, at 43 (“[L]eaders in Botswana . . . essentially accepted existing 
clientelistic practices and preserved intact the basic laws and structures inherited from the colonizers. . . 
.”); Crawford Young, The Colonial State and its Political Legacy, in THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE, supra 
note 122, at 56 (noting the long survival of the institutional synthesis of the terminal state in Botswana). 
 146.  SIDSEL SAUGESTAD, THE INCONVENIENT INDIGENOUS: REMOTE AREA DEVELOPMENT IN 
BOTSWANA, DONOR ASSISTANCE, AND THE FIRST PEOPLE OF THE KALAHARI 69 (2001). 
 147.  CHARLES PARKINSON, BILLS OF RIGHTS AND DECOLONIZATION: THE EMERGENCE OF 
DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IN BRITAIN’S OVERSEAS TERRITORIES 256 n.50 (2007). 
 148.  Lewis, supra note 134, at 12 (describing Khama’s party as “national, nontribal and nonracial”). 
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Tswana and the strong political presence of the Tswana at independence, 
nationalism in Botswana—whether consciously or not—was created by and 
for the Tswana people.149 This false sense of homogeneity has persisted 
throughout Botswana’s history. For instance, in 2006, Botswana voted in 
favor of delaying a vote for a United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples based on the argument that “[t]he country is made up of 
indigenous people, who could not be against themselves. If a shoe did not 
fit, only the person wearing the shoe would feel the pain.”150 Accordingly, 
the creation and articulation of nationalism predicated on citizenship rather 
than ethnicity in Botswana can be seen as an instrumental use of ethnicity by 
the historically institutionalized ethnic majority, the Tswana.151 As a result 
of this discursive strategy, a false consciousness of national ethnic 
homogeneity has persisted alongside an ignorance of existing ethnic 
heterogeneity in Botswana.152 
Botswana’s false sense of ethnic homogeneity has resulted in the 
codification of Tswana-based nationalism into the Constitution at 
independence. Of particular importance is the Botswana Constitution’s 
paradoxical ethnicity-blind nondiscrimination regime. Section 15(1) of the 
Constitution states that “no law shall make any provision that is 
discriminatory either of itself or in its effect,”153 and subsection (2) provides 
that “no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person 
acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of 
any public office or any public authority.”154 The term “discriminatory” is 
defined in subsection (3): 
[A]ffording different treatment to different persons, attributable wholly or 
mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, 
political opinions, colour or creed whereby persons of one such 
description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of 
another such description are not made subject or are accorded privileges 
or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such 
description.155 
 
 149.  SAUGESTAD, supra note 146, at 72. 
 150.  Press Release, General Assembly, Third Committee Approves Draft Resolution on Right to 
Development; Votes to Defer Action Concerning Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, GA/SHC/3878 
(Nov. 28, 2006). 
 151.  See Amelia Cook & Jeremy Sarkin, Who Is Indigenous?: Indigenous Rights Globally, in Africa, 
and Among the San in Botswana, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 93, 119–20 (2009) (“Of course, this 
objective was made easier by Tswana domination in the political and economic structures, and a policy 
of non-racialism is questionable in a country where a single ethnic group maintains most of the power.”). 
 152.  SAUGESTAD, supra note 146, at 69. 
 153.  BOTSWANA CONST. § 15(1). 
 154.  Id. § 15(2). 
 155.  Id. § 15(3). 
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Accordingly, the language of this provision, with its focus on 
differential treatment, appears to make it difficult for affirmative measures 
to be enacted in favor of certain ethnic or racial groups. Additionally, the 
kgotla—the Tswana’s model of local government and an exclusionary wolf 
in democratic sheep’s clothing—was formally incorporated into the national 
legal system.156 Although President Khama’s efforts to foster unity and non-
racialism have been lauded,157 a number of minority groups, including the 
San, have been harmed by this nationalist agenda.158 The next section 
specifically addresses the treatment of minority rights in Botswana. 
3.  Minority Rights: Pseudo Assimilationism 
Botswana exemplifies a state that appears neutral between various 
groups by affording individual rights to all citizens. However, the country 
systematically privileges the majority national group in certain fundamental 
ways.159 Indeed, Botswana has been criticized for its marginalization of 
minority ethnic groups, particularly the San, an indigenous group that has 
occupied the Kalahari Desert region as hunters and gatherers for over 40,000 
years, making them the oldest and arguably most culturally unique ethnic 
group in Botswana.160 Due to significant discrimination and marginalization 
by the Tswana-dominated government of Botswana, the San “are widely 
recognized as the most impoverished, disempowered, and stigmatized ethnic 
group in southern Africa.”161 The San have been “denied many of the 
benefits” of Botswana’s economic development and, consequently, “[m]any 
San in Botswana continue to be poor, with high unemployment rates, high 
infant mortality, high incarceration rates, low literacy levels, and few 
assets.”162 
The Minorities at Risk (“MAR”) dataset confirms the marginalization 
and discrimination of the San. Although MAR accounts for seventy-one 
variables, two are particularly noteworthy for this Article—Political 
Discrimination and Economic Discrimination. These are two of six variables 
used by MAR to describe disadvantages associated with ethnocultural 
groups and these variables measure access to two fundamental sets of human 
 
 156.  See PAUL NUGENT, AFRICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 128 (2004). 
 157.  See, e.g., SAUGESTAD, supra note 146, at 28, 77. 
 158.  DITSHWANELO, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT FOR THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 3 (2002). 
 159.  Solway, supra note 133, at 216 (quoting Will Kymlicka, Ethnicity in the USA, in THE 
ETHNICITY READER 229, 231 (Montserrat Guibernau & John Rex eds., 1997)). 
 160.  DITSHWANELO, supra note 136, § 2(a); DITSHWANELO, supra note 158, at 3. 
 161.  Renee Sylvain, “Land, Water, and Truth”: San Identity and Global Indigenism, 104 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 1074, 1074 (2002). 
 162.  Olmsted, supra note 8, at 802. 
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rights: political representation and beneficial socioeconomic conditions.163 
Political Discrimination (“POLDIS”) measures the extent to which “group 
members are or have been systematically limited in their enjoyments of 
political rights or access to political positions by comparison with other 
groups in their society.”164 It is coded on a five-category ordinal scale of 
severity.165 Last updated in 2006, the San received a POLDIS rating of 
three,166 indicating that there is “[s]ubstantial underrepresentation due to 
prevailing social practice by dominant groups” and that “[f]ormal public 
policies . . . are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset discriminatory 
practices.”167 Second, Economic Discrimination (“ECDIS”) measures the 
extent to which group members “are or have been systematically excluded 
from access to desirable economic goods, conditions, or positions that are 
open to other groups in their society.”168 It is coded on a similar five-category 
scale as POLDIS.169 The San also received an ECDIS rating of three,170 
indicating that there is “[s]ubstantial poverty and underrepresentation due to 
prevailing social practice by dominant groups” and that “[f]ormal public 
policies . . . are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and 
 
 163.  Minorities at Risk Project, Minorities at Risk Dataset: Botswana: San Bushmen, UNIV. OF MD., 
COLLEGE PARK, CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. & CONFLICT MGMT., http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessment. 
asp?groupId=57101 [https://perma.cc/DZ2H-LCMJ] (last visited Oct. 9, 2016) [hereinafter San MAR 
data]. 
 164.  TED ROBERT GURR, MINORITIES AT RISK 46 (1993). 
 165.  The coding for POLDIS is as follows: 0: No discrimination; 1: Substantial under-representation 
in political office and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are 
designed to protect or improve the group’s political status; 2: Substantial under-representation due to 
historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No 
evidence of protective or remedial public policies; 3: Substantial under-representation due to prevailing 
social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, 
inadequate to offset discriminatory social practices; 4: Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring 
repression) substantially restrict the group’s political participation by comparison with other groups. 
Minorities at Risk Project, UNIV. OF MD., COLLEGE PARK, CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. & CONFLICT MGMT., 
Minorities at Risk (MAR) Codebook Version 2/2009, 11, http://www.mar.umd.edu/data/mar_codebook 
_Feb09.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUB2-6UL6] (last visited Oct. 9, 2016) [hereinafter MAR Codebook]. 
 166.  San MAR data, supra note 163. 
 167.  GURR, supra note 164, at 47. 
 168.  Id. at 43. 
 169.  The coding for ECDIS is as follows: 0: No discrimination; 1: Significant poverty and under-
representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public 
policies are designed to improve the group’s material well-being; 2: Significant poverty and under-
representation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate 
exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group’s material well-being; 3: Significant 
poverty and under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public 
policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread 
discrimination; 4: Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the 
group’s economic opportunities by contrast with other groups. MAR Codebook, supra note 165, at 11. 
 170.  San MAR data, supra note 163. 
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widespread practices of discrimination.”171 MAR provides important insight 
into the low level of minority rights protection in Botswana. These insights 
may even be understated because the data does not take into consideration 
issues of particular importance to the San, such as land rights,172 and more 
recent minority rights claims made by the San, to which the Article now 
turns. 
For the last two decades, the San have brought a number of claims 
against the Government of Botswana involving land access and resource 
rights in the CKGR. Following the discovery of diamonds in the early 1980s, 
the Government of Botswana coerced and then forced virtually all of the San 
to leave the CKGR in three major clearances in 1997, 2002, and 2005.173 
These San now live in resettlement camps outside the reserve where alcohol, 
depression, and disease are rampant.174 As a result, the San initiated legal 
action before the High Court of Botswana in Sesana v. Attorney General.175 
The San lobbied three substantive claims against the Government of 
Botswana. First, the San claimed the Government of Botswana should be 
obliged to reinstate the basic services to the CKGR that were terminated in 
January 2002 and to maintain those services.176 Second, they argued that the 
Government unlawfully deprived them of their land and therefore must 
restore it to their lawful possession.177 Third, the San claimed the 
Government refused to issue Special Game Licenses to San living in the 
CKGR and prohibited them from entering the CKGR even with permits—
actions which were unlawful and unconstitutional.178 
Importantly, the Government of Botswana, echoing pre-colonial 
policies and an instrumental post-colonial discourse of national welfare, 
proffered two justifications for its forced relocation of the San. First, it 
argued that “removing the San is critical to protecting the wildlife and 
ecology of the Reserve because the San way of life, specifically hunting, 
 
 171.  GURR, supra note 164, at 45. 
 172.  Although not present in the 2006 data, MAR used to measure ecological stress by coding”the 
presence and severity of three conditions: competition with other groups for settlement of vacant lands, 
dispossession from land by other groups, and forced internal resettlement.” This variable, ECOSTRESS, 
was coded as a three-category ordinary variable (1 = minor, 3 = serious). Id. at 49–50. The San received 
a score of 3 for ECOSTRESS. Id. at tbl.A.11. 
 173.  Tribes and Campaigns: The Bushmen, SURVIVAL INTERNATIONAL, http:// 
www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/bushmen [https://perma.cc/FGX4-9SYL].  
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Sesana v. Att’y Gen., (52/2002) [2006] BWHC (Bots.), http://www.saflii.org/bw/cases/ 
BWHC/2006/1.html [https://perma.cc/JGX5-G6V5].. 
 176.  Id. at 455. 
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id. at 456.  
BROWER - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  9:05 AM 
2016] REFRAMING KURTZ’S PAINTING 63 
‘interferes with conservation.’”179 Second, “the [government argued] that the 
San must ‘develop’ themselves, something that they cannot do if left to their 
traditional lifestyles within the Reserve.”180 In light of the sophisticated 
management regime implemented in the Okavango Delta by the Government 
of Botswana that successfully balances environmental protection and 
indigenous livelihood, Kenneth Good has suggested the Government’s 
relocation was specifically tied to mineral wealth.181 In 2006, the High Court 
ruled in the San’s favor on every complaint but the first—relating to the 
provision of basic services—because the San were adequately informed with 
respect to their termination.182 However, the Government of Botswana has 
remained uncooperative in implementing the Court’s ruling.183 In fact, the 
U.S. Department of State criticized “[t]he government’s continued narrow 
interpretation” of the 2006 decision in its 2009 Human Rights Report on 
Botswana.184 
In 2010, the San brought legal action against the Government of 
Botswana before the High Court regarding their right to access water inside 
the CKGR.185 The cause of action stemmed from the Government of 
Botswana’s refusal to open a sealed borehole that ultimately forced the San 
to transport water hundreds of miles.186 Ruling against the San, Justice 
Lakhvinder Walia stated that the San “have become victims of their own 
decision to settle an inconveniently long distance from the services and 
facilities provided by the government.”187 The San later appealed and lost.188 
At both the regional and international level, these adverse judgments against 
the San have been met with significant criticism. Following Jusice Walia’s 
ruling, the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights noted in his 2010 report 
on Botswana that: 
 
 179.  Sarkin & Cook, supra note 8, at 15. 
 180.  Id.  
 181.  KENNETH GOOD, BUSHMEN AND DIAMONDS: (UN)CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOTSWANA 20 (2003). 
 182.  Sesana, supra note 175, at 322.  
 183.  Lucia Van der Post, Bushwhacked, TIMES ONLINE (Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.timesonline.co. 
uk/tol/news/world/africa/article2482706.ece.  
 184.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: BOTSWANA 1 (2010). 
 185.  Mosetlhanyane v. Att’y Gen. [2010] BLR 372 (HC) (Bots.). 
 186.  Mark Tran, Kalahari Bushmen to Appeal Against Court Ban on Well in Game Reserve, 
GUARDIAN (July 22, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/22/kalahari-bushmen-
bostwana-well-court-appeal [https://perma.cc/AH52-77YY]. 
 187.  Tshireletso Motlogelwa, Basarwa Lose Another One, MMEGIONLINE (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=3659&dir=2010/July/Thursday22 [https://perma.cc/595P-
6HBX]. 
 188.  Mosetlhanyane v. Att’y Gen, Appeal No. CACLB-074-10 (Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.), 
http://assets.survivalinternational.org/documents/545/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A9PX-MALD]. 
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The Government should fully and faithfully implement the Sesana 
judgment and take additional remedial action in accordance with 
international standards relating to the removal of indigenous peoples from 
their traditional lands. Such remedial action should include, at a minimum, 
facilitating the return of all those removed from the reserve who wish to 
do so, allowing them to engage in subsistence hunting and gathering in 
accordance with traditional practices, and providing them the same 
government services available to people of Botswana elsewhere, 
including, most immediately, access to water . . . Indigenous people who 
have remained or returned to the reserve face harsh and dangerous 
conditions due to a lack of access to water, a situation that could be easily 
remedied by reactivating the boreholes in the reserve. The Government 
should reactivate the boreholes or otherwise secure access to water for 
inhabitants of the reserve as a matter of urgent priority.189 
Ultimately, such policies are grounded in a historical and path 
dependent politicization of ethnicity and institutionalization of the Tswana 
as the ethno-political hegemon during colonial rule. 
C.  Ghana: Depoliticized yet Conscious Ethnicity 
1.  Pre-Independence: The Mismatch of Ethnicity and Tribe 
Like Botswana, Ghana was a British colony administered under a policy 
of indirect rule. Accordingly, “[t]he Gold Coast was generally conceived by 
the British as constituting a federation of ‘native states.’”190 Unlike 
Botswana, however, British colonial administrators took a fundamentally 
different approach with respect to the political organization of, and policies 
towards, ethnic groups in Ghana. While the British in Botswana reified, 
politicized, and institutionalized existing ethnic cleavages and consequently 
created an ethno-political hegemon in the Tswana, Ghanaian society 
presented a fundamental mismatch between ethnicity and political 
organization. Ethnicity and politics did not neatly fit together and thus did 
not produce ethnic cleavages as in in Botswana. The absence of ethnic 
cleavages also led to the lack of an ethno-political intermediary role similar 
to that held by the Tswana in Botswana. This political attenuation of 
ethnicity in Ghana has created a post-independence national discourse that 
is devoid of ethnic divisiveness, a set of policies that are highly self-
 
 189.  James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Botswana, ¶¶ 97–
98 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/37/Add.2 (June 2, 2010); see also Press Release, African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Press Release on the Situation Facing the Bushmen of the Central Kalahari 
Game Reserve in Botswana, UN Press Release ACHPR/08/d74 (Aug. 10, 2010) (noting that “[r]efusal to 
allow the Bushmen to use their existing borehole at Mothomelo can only be interpreted as a clear sign 
that the Government of Botswana is determined to continue what is perceived as a policy of keeping the 
Bushmen from returning home”). 
 190.  Lentz & Nugent, supra note 5, at 15. 
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conscious with respect to ethnic pluralism and inclusion, and relatively high 
levels of minority rights protections. 
The British effectively laid the foundations for modern day ethnic 
identities in Ghana by forming chiefdoms under colonial policies and by 
adopting the “tribe” as an essential normative concept.191 These policies 
speak to a larger discourse on colonial ethnic mapping projects that are 
“fundamentally about the power to name others [and are] increasingly bound 
up with an imaginary knowledge of the relationship between ethnic identities 
and socio-geographic space.”192 The British model was based on the belief 
that “every African belonged, from birth to death, in a singular tribe”—a 
population group linked by descent, a common language, and living on a 
particular territory—“that was clearly distinct from neighboring tribes 
through physiology, language, and culture.”193 The fundamental problem—
one which the more perceptive British colonial administrators and 
anthropologists themselves realized—is that the concept of the tribe “did not 
really capture the reality of physical mobility, overlapping networks and 
multiple group membership. [The anthropologists] knew that the boundaries 
of language, territory and descent hardly ever coincided.”194 
Thus, the tribe, itself a faux-monolithic concept that in reality cut across 
pre-existing ethnic groups, became the fundamental conceptual unit of 
colonial governance in Ghana. Ethnic alignments were further redefined by 
“tinkering with rural power structures” and codifying chieftaincy structures 
as functions of indirect rule.195 The linkage of falsely monolithic “tribes” to 
the politico-bureaucratic concept of the “native state” has been the 
“distinguishing feature of the ethnic experience in twentieth-century 
Ghana.”196 Ultimately, recognizing native states, rather than crystallizing 
extant ethnic cleavages, further reinforced ethnic fragmentation and political 
attenuation: “[t]he native states were not an agglomeration of tribes, but 
rather entities, whose borders were determined by factors quite different 
 
 191.  Id. at 9; see also MACLEAN, supra note 92, at 107 (identifying that “the British dedicated 
significant time and resources for colonial anthropologists to study, understand, and classify the different 
tribal groups in each colonial territory”); FREDERICK COOPER, DECOLONIZATION AND AFRICAN SOCIETY: 
THE LABOR QUESTION IN FRENCH AND BRITISH AFRICA 49–50 (1996) (highlighting how the “ideological 
power of the ‘tribe’” shaped colonial policies) (internal citation omitted). 
 192.  Eric Worby, Maps, Names, and Ethnic Games: The Epistemology and Iconography of Colonial 
Power in North-Western Zimbabwe, 20 J.S. AFR. STUD. 371, 371 (1994). 
 193.  See Carola Lentz, Contested Identities: The History of Ethnicity in Northwestern Ghana, in 
ETHNICITY IN GHANA, supra note 5, at 137–38; LENTZ, supra note 114, at 75. 
 194.  Lentz & Nugent, supra note 5, at 9; see also LENTZ, supra note 114, at 75 (focusing on the 
“overlapping identities and fuzzy boundaries” of the Black Volta region specifically). 
 195.  Lentz & Nugent, supra note 5, at 18. 
 196.  Id. at 10. 
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from ethnic ones, the ethnic labels being attached ex post facto.”197 Thus, at 
the conceptual and institutional levels, indirect rule produced a 
fundamentally different administrative policy with respect to ethnicity in 
Ghana than in Botswana, where policies were grounded in a false sense of 
ethnic homogeneity and ultimately crystallized political power for the 
Tswana. 
As pre-colonial ethnic groups in Ghana have been fragmented several 
times under British colonial rule—first at the conceptual level of the tribe 
and then with the institutional linkage of the tribe to the native state—there 
is a noticeable difference in the degree of politicization of ethnicity in Ghana 
as compared to Botswana. Since ethnicity and political organization in 
Ghana did not map neatly onto one another, no ethno-political hegemon 
appears to have emerged as a colonial intermediary, as with the Tswana in 
Botswana. Additionally, because of decentralized and ethnically cross-
cutting administrative policies in Ghana, inter-ethnic and inter-regional 
political conflict at the center remained minimal.198 Ultimately, one 
“prominent casualty” of British colonial administration in Ghana was the 
dismantling and depoliticization of pre-colonial ethnic identities.199 
Depoliticization ultimately led to a much different post-independence 
approach to ethnic politics and minority rights in Ghana than in Botswana, 
where the Tswana were entrenched as ethnic and political hegemons. 
2.  Post-Independence: Politicized Ethnicity as Anathema 
In 1957, Ghana became the first African nation to gain independence 
from colonial rule, and its emergence into nationhood—both at the 
discursive and institutional levels—was characterized by a lack of ethnic 
politics. The goal of the post-independence Ghanaian political leaders was 
to “create a unitary mobilizing political system in which ethnic distinctions 
would be eradicated in favor of a common Ghanaian nationality and a 
homogeneous political culture.”200 Under the banner of the Convention 
People’s Party, future-President Kwame Nkrumah claimed to represent the 
common man and articulated the rhetoric of both Afro-Marxism and Afro-
nationalism.201 Although Ghana and Botswana share similarities with respect 
 
 197.  LENTZ, supra note 114, at 105.  
 198.  DAVID R. SMOCK & AUDREY C. SMOCK, THE POLITICS OF PLURALISM: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF LEBANON AND GHANA 65 (1975). 
 199.  See, e.g., Jean Allman, Be(com)ing Asante, Be(com)ing Akan: Thoughts on Gender, Identity, 
and the Colonial Encounter, in ETHNICITY IN GHANA, supra note 5, at 108 (focusing on the British 
colonial relationship with the Asante). 
 200.  SMOCK & SMOCK, supra note 198, at 6–7. 
 201. See BOONE, supra note 107, at 159; MACLEAN, supra note 92, at 113 (noting Nkrumah famously 
proclaimed “[t]he CPP is Ghana; Ghana is the CPP”). 
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to their nationalist discourse, they diverge with respect to their 
instrumentalities. While Botswana’s nationalist discourse sought to further 
concentrate power of the Tswana ethnic majority, Ghanaian nationalism was 
largely class-based and sought to unite the country. Furthermore, rather than 
eliminating ethnicity from Ghanaian politics, there has remained a sensitivity 
to ethnic pluralism in Ghana with respect to both discourse and policy—
undoubtedly a function of its historic depoliticization during colonialism. An 
important institutional difference between Botswana and Ghana was that the 
latter did not receive a boilerplate bill of rights from Britain.202 Instead, the 
Ghanaian constituent assembly required the president to make a Declaration 
of Fundamental Principles upon taking the oath of office; one key principle 
of the Declaration was respect for human rights.203 Such an institutional 
difference in both the nature and scope of rights suggests a more 
accommodationist approach to minority rights in Ghana. 
As a whole, ethnic fronts have played less of a role with respect to 
partisan clashes in Ghana.204 At the discursive level, ethnicity has been 
“episodic” and “elusive” in Ghana, but in a rather surprising and 
counterintuitive way.205 Ethnicity is not expected to play an overt political 
role and is actually frowned upon as a basis for political action. For instance, 
Victor Owusu’s pronouncement in the Parliament of the Second Republic 
that the Ewe ethnic group was nepotistic caused a furor because it was 
considered un-Ghanaian to speak in such terms.206 However, ethnicity has 
received “implicit support” with respect to the promotion of nation building 
and policies focusing on the appreciation of cultural diversity.207 This overall 
shift in discourse away from politicizing ethnicity while retaining it for its 
cultural importance is illustrated by several post-independence policies and 
state actions. First, the replacement of native authorities by elected local 
councils has further depoliticized the concept of the tribe. The concept has 
since evolved from being the natural foundation of Ghanaian communities 
to mere shorthand for groups that speak different languages and hold 
different cultural traditions.208 Second, the Ghanaian state has taken a 
particularly active role in celebrating ethnic diversity at the national level: 
The full panoply of cultural festivals has been enumerated, collated and 
codified by central authority. It has become customary for the head of 
 
 202.  PARKINSON, supra note 147, at 132. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  LENTZ, supra note 114, at 200. 
 205.  Lentz & Nugent, supra note 5, at 1. 
 206.  See SMOCK & SMOCK, supra note 198, at 247–48 (describing one instance of the hostility and 
resistance towards accusations of “inward-looking tribalism”). 
 207.  Lentz & Nugent, supra note 5, at 10. 
 208.  Id.; LENTZ, supra note 114, at 255–56. 
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government and the Regional Ministers to attend the most important 
festivals on a regular cycle. It is at the durbars that the most important 
speeches are delivered, from where they are relayed to the country at large 
by means of radio, television and the newspapers. In a sense, therefore, 
the Ghanaian state enacts itself at these cultural festivals.209 
Lastly, Ghana has adopted a “semi-articulated policy of 
multiculturalism” where traditional cultural elements from different regions 
are incorporated into national traditions. For instance, President Jerry 
Rawlings has alternated between suits, kente cloths, and northern smocks on 
public occasions.210 Additionally, national radio and television programs 
have made a conscious effort to offer broadcasts in all major languages, and 
national institutions such as the Ghanaian Dance Ensemble incorporate 
songs and dances from major ethnic groups.211 Thus, the dichotomy of 
cultural institutionalization and political deinstitutionalization of ethnicity in 
Ghana neatly follows from the low degree of ethno-political cleavage 
developed under British colonial rule. This particular approach to ethnicity 
in Ghana, along with a political culture of multiculturalism, has had 
important implications for minority rights protections. 
3.  Minority Rights: Successful Integrationism 
Compared to Botswana’s well-documented failures to protect minority 
rights—illustrated by the Tswana’s marginalization of the San—Ghana 
holds a markedly strong record of minority rights protection, influenced by 
the depoliticization of ethnicity during colonialism and the development of 
a multicultural institutional legacy in the post-independence period. 
Comparing Botswana and Ghana using the MAR dataset offers the first 
empirical glimpse into the two countries’ approaches to minority rights. As 
of 2006 (when the MAR was last updated), the Ashanti and Ewe ethnic 
groups received ratings of zero with respect to the Political Discrimination 
variable, POLDIS;212 indicating that there is “no discrimination.”213 The 
 
 209.  Lentz & Nugent, supra note 5, at 16. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Minorities at Risk Project, Minorities at Risk Dataset: Ghana: Ashanti, UNIV. OF MD., 
COLLEGE PARK, CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. & CONFLICT MGMT., http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessment.asp 
?groupId=45201 [https://perma.cc/9VZJ-LHAA] (last visited Oct. 9, 2016) [hereinafter Ashanti MAR 
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CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. & CONFLICT MGMT., http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessment.asp?groupId= 45202 
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Ashanti and Ewe received similar ratings of zero on the Economic 
Discrimination variable, ECDIS;214 also evidence of “no discrimination.”215 
Undertaking a qualitative analysis of minority rights in Ghana is 
somewhat tricky due to a lack of data; scholars rarely write about a dog that 
does not bark. However, several policies illustrate of Ghana’s protection of 
minority rights. First, the active role of the Ghanaian state in protecting and 
utilizing the cultural traditions of a variety of ethnic groups, both discursively 
and as a matter of policy, are important indicators of Ghana’s multicultural 
political identity and tradition.216 Second, the Ghanaian state has consciously 
sought to integrate ethnic groups into the political process. Perhaps the most 
notable example was the ethnic sensitivity of President Rawlings’ Ewe-led 
regime.217 In addition to Rawlings—an Ewe himself—the Provisional 
National Defense Council (“PNDC”) “included two Akans, two Gas, and 
two northerners; moreover, the twenty-nine member cabinet was composed 
of seven northerners, seven Fante, three Gas, and twelve Akan members.”218 
It is particularly telling that an ethnic minority-led military coup appointed 
members of other ethnic groups, let alone the ethnic majority group (the 
Akan). Ultimately, this example suggests a cognizance of ethnic differences 
coupled with a dearth of ethno-political salience. Lastly, Ghana has a history 
of strong redistributional policies targeted toward ethnic groups that have 
been economically disadvantaged.219 For instance, President Rawlings was 
instrumental in implementing a structural adjustment program that 
effectively reversed urban-rural terms of trade in favor of rural farmers.220 
Additionally, Rawlings “limited expenditures on urban hospitals to 50 
percent of the national health budget in an effort to channel resources and 
trained personnel to less advantaged subregions.”221 He also “spoke of the 
need to establish university campuses in all of the country’s subregions.”222 
Accordingly, Ghana’s historical legacy of ethnic depoliticization and the 
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lack of an ethno-political hegemon prior to independence have 
fundamentally shaped Ghanaian politics which now promote 
multiculturalism and minority rights protection, both discursively and 
institutionally. 
V.  REFRAMING HISTORY? MINORITY RIGHTS LOOKING 
FORWARD 
This Article has provided a historio-institutional approach to 
understanding current variations in states’ protections of ethnic minority 
rights by focusing on the importance of colonial legacies and their enduring, 
path dependent effects. Rather than looking normatively at colonial 
governments as the “crushers of rocks” or the nefarious metaphor of Kurtz’s 
painting, this Article focuses analytically on the variation of colonial 
administrations and policies with respect to how ethnicity is conceptualized, 
politicized, and institutionalized, and how colonial policies endure following 
independence and manifest themselves through starkly different levels of 
modern protections for ethnic minorities. Specifically, countries with a 
history of colonial policies that institutionalized ethnicity as a salient 
political cleavage and reinforced that cleavage through the utilization of a 
colonial intermediary are more likely to experience lower levels of minority 
rights protection due to the crystallization of ethnic identities and the 
endurance of institutional power asymmetries between ethnic groups. The 
Tswana ethnic majority in Botswana has followed this script in effectively 
marginalizing the San throughout history. However, in Ghana, ethnicity has 
been depoliticized due to the uneven mapping of ethnicity onto the “tribe” 
concept and the political institutionalization of the tribe concept into the 
native state. As a result, post-independence Ghana has witnessed low levels 
of ethnic political cleavage, recognition of the importance of ethnicity in 
providing cultural diversity, and a national culture of multiculturalism. 
Accordingly, Ghana has enjoyed a strong history of minority rights 
protection. Ultimately, history cannot be forgotten in understanding current 
human rights practices. 
As a matter of policy, this Article speaks to larger questions focusing 
on the debate between integrationist approaches that focus on depoliticizing 
ethnicity through a lack of recognition and accommodationist approaches 
that focus on recognizing inherent ethno-cultural differences, embracing 
these differences, and articulating a multi-ethnic national discourse.223 
Within this debate is a more specific question—how public policy, 
institutional design, and constitutional design can be used to accomplish the 
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aforementioned goals. A salient example of this debate is Rwanda’s existing 
policy that bans individuals from identifying according to ethnic terms.224 
This Article provides support for such policies that embrace and promote 
depoliticization. Historically, ethnicity in Rwanda has bred significant 
political cleavage, both in terms of the crystallization of previously fluid 
Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities by Belgian colonizers and the creation of an ethno-
political hegemon in the Tutsis.225 Although institutions are relatively 
resistant to change, the 1994 genocide represents a critical juncture through 
which the Rwanda state can help to fundamentally change otherwise path 
dependent institutions. As such, Rwanda has the opportunity to depoliticize 
ethnicity and reform colonial-induced cleavages for future generations. 
In addition to contributing to a bourgeoning research agenda focusing 
on the importance of historical and long-term structural conditions and their 
effects on human rights obligations,226 this Article itself has important 
implications for future research. Qualitatively, this Article’s theory focusing 
on colonial legacies can be further explored through additional case studies. 
A focus on the “false twins” of Rwanda and Burundi—both colonized by 
Belgium and characterized by high degrees of ethno-political conflict—
could contribute significantly to the theory pronounced within this Article. 
A comparative analysis of French colonies may be equally intriguing due to 
their assimilationist approaches to ethnicity and their centralized styles of 
colonial administration. Building on Boone’s theory of uneven development, 
within-case analysis could be instructive to develop more nuanced theories 
of colonial legacies focusing on differing treatment of specific minority 
groups due to differences in intra-colony policy. Quantitatively, formal 
modeling using the MAR dataset would provide opportunities to identify and 
control for important historical, institutional, and structural variables that 
affect minority rights protections. This modeling would potentially provide 
more external validity to the arguments within this Article. Ultimately, 
understanding history is critical to understanding how states recognize 
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minority rights that are critical within ethnically-divided societies, but often 
challenging to protect and enforce. 
 
